Distributing and Obfuscating Firewalls via Oblivious Bloom Filter
  Evaluation by Goss, Ken & Jiang, Wei
Distributing and Obfuscating Firewalls via
Oblivious Bloom Filter Evaluation
Ken Goss
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri
Email: kgoss@mail.missouri.edu
Wei Jiang
University of Missouri
Columbia, MO
Email: wjiang@missouri.edu
Abstract—Firewalls have long been in use to protect local
networks from threats of the larger Internet. Although firewalls
are effective in preventing attacks initiated from outside, they
are vulnerable to insider threats, e.g., malicious insiders may
access and alter firewall configurations, and disable firewall
services. In this paper, we develop an innovative distributed
architecture to obliviously manage and evaluate firewalls to
prevent both insider and external attacks oriented to the firewalls.
Our proposed structure alleviates these issues by obfuscating
the firewall rules or policies themselves, then distributing the
function of evaluating these rules across multiple servers. Thus,
both accessing and altering the rules are considerably more
difficult thereby providing better protection to the local network
as well as greater security for the firewall itself. We achieve this
by integrating multiple areas of research such as secret sharing
schemes and multi-party computation, as well as Bloom filters
and Byzantine agreement protocols. Our resulting solution is an
efficient and secure means by which a firewall may be distributed,
and obfuscated while maintaining the ability for multiple servers
to obliviously evaluate its functionality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Firewalls are a very common security tool used to protect
local networks from threats present in the larger Internet.
This is achieved by various strategies, the most basic of
which is a packet filter [1]. This type of firewall checks each
incoming packet against some set of rules often represented by
a “blacklist” or “whitelist”. With the increasing sophistication
of attacks on firewalls from both internal and external threat,
there has been an interest to distribute the functionality and
management of the firewall [2], [3], [4], [5]. While this does
allow a large number of machines in the local network to
potentially maintain protection without dependence on the
functionality of a central server, it also presents the opportunity
for individual users inside the firewall to disable or circumvent
the rules of their now localized firewall. Furthermore, if the
rules of these firewalls exist in plaintext form, as it is often
the case in practice, the rules themselves may be considered
sensitive information due to a desire to hide the identities
and locations of whitelisted external users, or the identities
and locations of those blacklisted sources the administration
consider as threats.
If we consider a brief vignette, we may encounter Carl, a
corporate employee, who has received some incentive to act
in the professional interests of others besides exclusively his
employer. Thus, depending on his actions whether they may
be passive or active attacks, he can readily and more easily
gain access to the corporate system infrastructure.
• In the passive case, he may copy the data contained in the
firewall rules. If the firewall rules represent a blacklist,
he may learn some information to share concerning the
identity or location of entities considered as threats to
the corporation. Alternatively, if the firewall represents
a whitelist, he may learn and leak information regard-
ing allies or affiliates identities or locations outside the
corporate intranet.
• If instead his attacks are more active, he may be able to
insert or delete entries from either black or white lists
either of which could prove disastrous for the network,
its assets, and desired functionalities.
To prevent these attacks, we may argue that firewall rules
can be encrypted and access control policies can be used to
restrict entities to access firewall configuration files. However,
these techniques are not sufficient for the following reasons:
• Encrypted firewall policies and rules: When the firewall
policies and rules are encrypted with a symmetric key
encryption scheme such as AES [6], only the person who
has the secret key can decrypt these files to access the
actual policies and rules. However, during firewall evalu-
ation process for a new network package, the rules have
to be decrypted first. This opens the door for attackers
to access these policies and rules without knowing the
secret key. In addition, when a security breach occurs,
the secret key may get exposed, and consequently, so do
the encrypted firewall files.
• More restrictive access control policies: Suppose that
mandatory access controls restrict the access to firewall
files to the root or a small group of privileged users. Nev-
ertheless, security breaches, exploring unknown vulnera-
bilities of the network, can bypass access control mecha-
nisms. In addition, human errors and mis-configurations
of firewall policies can inadvertently expose sensitive
firewall files to other internal users and outside attackers.
Insider threats to enterprise network security has been a topic
of greatly increasing interest among researchers as they seek to
address issues of identifying malicious insiders, understanding
the limits of the threats they may pose, and the extent of
damages which are possible from various thresholds of actions
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Fig. 1. Oblivious firewalls
they may take [7], [8]. These researches have progressed
into attempts to construct predictive models for identifying
malicious inside entities and their attacks [9], [10]. The
practical utility of such inquiries has been made clear due
to the dramatic recent increases of specifically these types of
malicious insiders exploiting the access and network privilege
with which they have been entrusted. Network security news
and information security sites are rife with articles document-
ing cases of internal breaches and concern over future insider
attacks of a similar nature [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].
Based on the aforementioned observations, to maximize
firewall protection from both internal and external attacks,
we need a novel way to manage firewalls. Ideally, firewall
rules should be encrypted and remain encrypted during firewall
evaluation process. In addition, we should not rely on one
server to manage the firewalls because when a security breach
occurs, even encrypted data can get disclosed and firewalls
services can be disabled. Therefore, to hide the firewall rules
and policies and achieve certain degree of fault-tolerance,
we need to utilize a distributed architecture and innovative
ways to “encrypt” or “hide” the firewall rules and policies.
Simultaneously, the architecture and firewall hiding method
should allow secure and oblivious firewall policy evaluations
without decrypting the hidden firewall information.
A. Our Contributions
We propose a means by which with relatively low additional
overhead, a system is established to allow for the rules and
functionality of the firewall system to be distributed in such
a way that they are information theoretically secure against
local inspection, and resistant to tampering due to the tech-
niques we employ. Figure 1 shows a high level overview of
the proposed distributed architecture which requires at least
three servers. The firewall is secretly distributed among the
servers with either additive or Shamir secret sharing schemes
[16]; thus, each server alone will not be able to discover
any information regarding the firewall. Unlike the previous
distributed approaches, our proposed architecture and secure
evaluation methods to distributing a firewall does not allow
any individual machine to circumvent the firewall.
Additionally, it could be made resilient to failures as cited as
a motivating factor for many other distributed approaches. To
achieve this we may allow the servers to continue functioning
so long as, out of m total servers, at least some threshold t
remain operational. This is possible when implemented, as
we suggest, under the Shamir secret sharing scheme. This
property of resilience in the face of component failure is a
key feature of this scheme. We make use of some previous
research, such as this scheme’s resilience properties, as well
as some novel strategies to achieve these results as will be
discussed in Section IV.
Furthermore, we employ secure multi-party computation
(SMC) techniques to securely and obliviously evaluate the
firewall criteria checking function efficiently through the use
of a distributed and secret shared Bloom filters. Following the
sharing of the Bloom filter constructed from the information
a given desired firewall functionality, our proposed methods
will generally proceed as follows:
1) During a brief and trusted initialization phase, the filter
to represent the firewall is constructed and shared.
2) Following this initialization, any gateway receiving a
packet invokes a set membership query with respect to
the related information.
3) The distributed firewall servers, acting as shareholders in
the secret sharing scheme, cooperate to calculate shares
of the result which is sent to the gateway.
4) The gateway reconstructs the result of the distributed
multi-party computation and either rejects or forwards
the packet.
The above steps can easily be adopted by many systems
with little software modification in their existing routing and
firewall protocols. In summary, the desirable properties of our
system allows for a local network of arbitrary topology with
respect to connection to the outside Internet, to securely, and
obliviously, evaluate firewall rules in a distributed manner
while maintaining the ability to tolerate some margin of
component failure or malicious behavior. We provide analysis
concerning the resilience of our scheme against the previ-
ously mentioned attacks to demonstrate its merit from the
perspective of security, and we analyze the complexity of our
approaches to demonstrate its efficiency. Finally, we present
some options for various modifications depending on desires
for security and the effects these alterations have on efficiency
as an interesting trade-off. Next we formally define the threat
models and adversary behaviors that can be prevented by using
the proposed techniques. The types of adversaries and their
attacks that we consider fall into two main categories, passive
and active. These types of adversaries have different abilities
which present challenges to protocols secure under each. The
passive adversary generally follows the prescribed steps of a
protocol and maintains a record of the protocol execution for
analysis in order to extract additional information from the
execution image of the protocol. If any additional information,
beyond what can be inferred from the private input and output,
the protocol is not secure against this type of adversary. In
general, all passive attacks are related to this type of behavior,
and there is no need to distinguish between adversaries inside
or outside of the local intranet. While the threshold of difficulty
for this kind of attack is likely lower for an internal agent, the
definition of a passive attack and necessary security measures
against it remains the same.
The active attacks we consider, perpetrated by a malicious
adversary, goes further to alter the result of the computations
via a wide array of possible actions. In our setting, we consider
both these two types of attacks against our attempts to secure
the firewall itself, those which are purely passive, and those
which are active attacks. Specifically, we consider gaining
information from accessing servers which are a part of our
proposed system to extract data, monitoring processes and
traffic local to a particular machine, or monitoring network
traffic attempting to gain information concerning the firewall,
disabling servers in our proposed system, modifying protected
data on such servers, and reading protected data. Divided into
their two categories, the attacks we will consider and make
efforts to secure against are the following:
• Passive
– Extracting information from local data
– Observe traffic passing through a particular machine
– Observe network traffic
• Active
– Disable a server participating in the scheme
– Read protected data
– Modify protected data
Under the proposed system architecture, we develop two
classes of secure protocols to obliviously manage firewalls.
In particular, the first class offers security guarantees against
passive adversaries, and the other class can detect malicious
activities and the parties involved in these activities, and
recover from their activities up to a threshold. Then the
malicious activities can be corrected, and malicious parties
can be removed from further participation immediately.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents foundational information regarding firewalls and more
details concerning recent concerns and developments, and
Section III discusses the underlying tools needed build up our
scheme, including Bloom Filters and Secret Sharing. Then, we
present our protocol in detail in Section IV, describing their
functionality and procedure along with analysis concerning
complexity, security, and correctness. Finally, we conclude by
summarizing our contribution in Section V, and indicate areas
for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Firewalls in general have been in existence nearly as long as
computer networking. The earliest functions simply involved
a router or gateway server maintaining a list of addresses to
block or permit. These are so-called blacklists and whitelists
respectively [1]. As sophistication increased divergent interests
produced multiple approaches to securing local subnets against
threats from the Internet at large. These include rules to block
entire domains or sub-domains, as well as a wide array of
means by which these rules may be optimized for both security
and efficiency. [17]. While very quick, this method potentially
allows for a single point of failure in both terms of network
functionality, as well as security. It is possible in this case
that an adversary, particularly an internal one, may be able to
access the list of permitted or prohibited addresses and use
this information outside the desired context or for nefarious
purposes. Additionally, if access to the file containing the lists
is obtained, it may be possible for an adversary to grant access
to other external undesirable, and previously blocked parties,
or hinder the ability of a legitimate party to connect. These
are important and perhaps critical concerns.
One means by which a firewall may be represented in terms
of a whitelist or blacklist is through the structure of a Bloom
Filter [18]. This type of data structure quickly and efficiently
gives set membership in probabilistic terms. The efficiency
of this scheme is particularly strong with respect to space.
This important topic, on which our work is dependent, will be
addressed more thoroughly in Section III. This data structure
has been used in firewall constructions previously to good
effect [19].
Additionally, a considerable amount of research is in reli-
ably distributing the functionality of a firewall throughout a
network to varying degrees with accordingly varying rates of
efficiency and security [20]. This is motivated by a variety of
concerns and for an array of settings from cellular networks
to cryptocurrencies and enterprise systems [18], [21]. While
advantageous from an resilience perspective, or in a situation
where restricted network topology is not possible or practical
this approach can have risks of its own [22]. If the filter for
a particular device or user is local to the system in question,
many users may take steps to circumvent this policy. This
is much more readily achievable for users with direct access
to the system implementing the firewall than if it were a
separate dedicated and more secure system in the network
infrastructure for the subnet. Our interest in distributing the
firewall is to distribute it in an oblivious means, distinct
from these approaches, such that the individual machines
cannot simultaneously alter the result of the firewall and
maintain anonymity. This is discussed in greater depth in the
presentation of our proposed protocols in Section IV.
A combined approach allows for the distribution of the
firewall, represented by a set of bloom filters [23]. This is
useful especially when network topology is not constrained to
a single gateway making the bridge between the local network
and the Internet, a common occurrence in mesh networks. In
this setting the filters are individually based on the acceptance
of packets at each node [23], [24], and forwarding a packet
from one neighbor to another is dependent on the filters
associated with the forwarding table. A packet is forwarded
if the destination node has whitelisted the source node. This
approach still allows for potential manipulation of the filters
without the ability to detect malicious activities, and is less
efficient than more centralized approaches.
Software defined networking has recently shown great
promise to ameliorate the issues related to much of net-
working’s inherent hardware dependence. It allows for both
hardware abstraction, leading to greater flexibility, as well as
a separation between data handling and forwarding and traffic
controls [25]. This separation of concerns is certainly generally
advantageous from the perspective of flexibility and efficiency,
witness the more than a decade ongoing effort to update the
infrastructure from IPv4 to IPv6 so the connection is both
feasible and reliable [26]. Even today, adoption is estimated
at around only 23% [27]. While this has many advantageous
properties, it does not inherently impart any greater security
to the operations which is a primary motivator for our work.
Firewalls implemented under this paradigm may still leak
undesirable information, and they may still be maliciously
altered in some circumstances.
III. PRELIMINARIES
For our proposed methods to follow, we require two ad-
ditional pieces of research upon which our solution is built.
These are Bloom Filters, as previously mentioned, as well as
secret sharing. These two mathematical structures form the
foundation of what we propose. Additionally here we will
introduce our discussion of adversary models, some properties
of the schemes we employ with respect to these potential
adversaries, as well as some introduction to the possibilities
for various network topologies.
A. Bloom Filters
This probabilistic data structure is eminently beneficial in
a setting for which tests of membership in a large set are
both frequent, and can tolerate a small to negligible chance
of false positives while guaranteeing no false negatives [28].
The mathematical underpinning of this data structure relies
on hashing, and the probability of hash collisions as well as
the probability of the entire vector of values eventually being
changed to represent set membership. Constructing a Bloom
filter involves generating a vector of bits of length β. The η
values to be represented in the filter are each hashed with κ
distinct hash functions. The result of the hash, modulo β, is
used as an index to the bit array, and the resulting location is
set. If the resulting index location was already 1, it is left as 1.
Testing for set membership involves calculating the hashes for
the object of the query, accessing each location, and verifying
that every resulting location is 1. If any location is not 1, the
queried object does not belong to the set [19].
A small and simple example is given in Figure 2. Here the
first vector denotes the initialization of a filter consisting of
8 locations indexed from left to right by values in {0 . . . 7}.
The second represents the insertion of the element 5. We have
hashed the value 5 with three hash functions in this example,
FNV132, MD5, and SHA1. The result of each hash function,
modulo 8, is 2, 4, and 5, respectively. As can be seen in the
figure, each of these locations are set to 1. The filter contains
only one element, 5. If we test for set membership with a value
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 00 01 1 1
5
0 0 00 01 1 1
2
Fig. 2. Process of Bloom filter creation, item insertion, and query
2, we calculate the hash values with the same hash functions,
modulo 8, which are 5, 0, and 4, for the same functions,
respectively. In the case of indices 5 and 4, the filter contains
1, but for location 0 a 0 is present. All tested locations are not
equal to one, therefore the filter correctly indicates that 2 is
not a set member.
The probabilistic nature of this structure is related to the
collision probability and the fact that, given a sufficiently large
number of elements in the set of interest, and a sufficiently
small filter, the rate of collision increases. This results in,
eventually, an item which is not in the set testing positive for
set membership under a query through a sufficient number
of collisions with other elements. Given enough elements,
the entire filter may fill with set bits, thus permitting every
query to be evaluated as a set member. With appropriately
chosen parameters the event of a false positive test for set
membership can be made negligible. The relationship between
these variables can be derived fairly intuitively. The probability
that any individual bit location is still 0 after inserting η
elements, hashed by κ hash functions, in a filter with β
locations is
p =
(
1− 1
β
)κη
≈ e−κη/β (1)
Thus the probability of a false positive is approximately
(1− p)κ ≈ .6185β/η . As discussed in [20], the optimal error
rate occurs when p = 12 thus a set of parameters for which the
following approximate equality holds, constrained by integer
values for each parameter, is a set of nearly optimal choices:
κ ≈ β
η
ln 2 (2)
B. Secret Sharing
Secret Sharing schemes present the ability to break data
up into multiple shares, distribute the shares, and perform
computations based on these shares rather than the data, for
which a strong concern of privacy exists. This can be used to
construct one solution to the classic “Millionaire’s problem”.
1) Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme: The scheme we focus
on for this work is Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [29]. In this
setting, the data is set as the constant term of a polynomial of
degree t−1 for some threshold t ≥ 2. Arbitrarily many parties
m may be involved in the scheme, but to keep complexities
minimal, if there is no desire for multiplications, m may be
set equal to t. If multiplications are desired m may be set
to m = 2t − 1. If resilience in either case is desired, in this
scheme, it is possible through setting m > t or m > 2t − 1
dependent on the desirability for multiplication or not [30].
a) Constructing shares: Formally, a secret value, s, is
placed within a t− 1 degree polynomial f of the form:
f(x) = (ct−1xt−1+ct−2xt−2+· · ·+c2x2+c1x+s) mod N
in which all constants ct−1 through c1 are chosen from a
uniform random distribution on the domain of the secret, ZN .
For all parties indexed by, i, in the range [1,m] the share, for
each party is constructed:
[s]PiN = f(i)
b) Rebuilding Secrets: Lagrange Polynomial Interpola-
tion is the method of choice for these operations. Due to our
interest being the y-intercept the general formula,
f(x) =
m∑
j=1
yj
m∏
k=1:k 6=j
x− xk
xj − xk
may be somewhat simplified because every variable x in the
preceding equation, for our case, is 0.
s = f(0) =
m∑
j=1
[s]
Pj
N
m∏
k=1:k 6=j
−xk
xj − xk
c) Addition: In the Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme, ad-
dition is “free” in that no communication is required between
parties, and no lengthy local computations are necessary. For
two values, a and b, which are shared among the parties, the
shared sum is computed by each party Pi locally computing
their new share by adding their shares of the secrets a and b:
[a+ b]PiN = [a]
Pi
N + [b]
Pi
N
Addition of a public constant c is affected simply through
the addition of this constant into each party’s shares
[a+ c]PiN = [a]
Pi
N + c
d) Multiplication: Multiplication of a public constant c
is affected simply through the multiplication of this constant
into each party’s shares
[ac]PiN = c[a]
Pi
N
Due to the fact that this scheme is inherently a linear
scheme, multiplication of two shared values is a more complex
process. If we were to simply multiply the shares as we added
them in the previous case, we would get a set of shares
representing a polynomial of an order twice that of the what
it was previously. This would be disastrous for the system
as a whole. For some data, nearly twice the desired number
of shares would be required for the reconstruction of the
secret. The system would be made up of inconsistent share
representations based on polynomials of differing degree.
In order to achieve multiplication for two shared values
a and b, and get the product, shared, ab, we must compute
the product of all the shares. However, it is necessary to
also handle some additional communications and calculations
by which the final polynomial maintains the same degree as
was previously desired, as well as uniform randomness. It is
important to note that if multiplication is a desired operation,
the number of parties holding shares, m, must be greater
than or equal to 2t − 1. This is required in order to be able
to reduce the order of the polynomial. The degree reduction
following the multiplication of the shares is achieved by the
sharing of additional randomized information among all those
holding shares and then combining the results. This too must
be done in a multi-party and secure manner lest intermediate
calculations be leaked and provide an adversary an opportunity
to learn about the secrets. The introduction and proof of this
method is given by Gennaro et al [31].
Each party initially computes the product of their shares
[q]PiN ← [a]PiN [b]PiN which is an intermediate value for each
party in this protocol. They each independently, and uniformly
randomly construct polynomials of the same degree desired for
the system and set the constant, or y-intercept to their inter-
mediate calculated value, [q]PiN . Each of the local equations
will be of the form:
hi(x) = (ct−1xt−1+ct−2xt−2+· · ·+c2x2+c1x+[q]PiN ) mod N
Each party then generates, exactly as the dealer would with a
new value to be shared, a set of shares from this polynomial
for each of the parties in the scheme. This is done by randomly
and uniformly creating shares of the product of the data points
by each party and for each party. These must be shared so that
a new and similarly uniform random polynomial of the desired
degree can be calculated by each peer.
∀i, j ∈ [1,m], [R]Pi,jN = hi(j)
Players then exchange these shares [R]Pi,jN of their interme-
diately calculated values, sending them from Pi to Pj and
keeping the value applicable for its own index, where i = j.
Thus each party gains a set of values from each other party
in the scheme. These values must be combined with weights
that reflect the reduction of order desired. This recombination
vector is applied via a dot product with the values from the
other parties and the result is a valid share, of the proper
degree, for the product of interest. More details are available
in the referenced works, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
2) Additive Secret Sharing: If the concern for the network
is only passive adversaries, a large boost in efficiency may
be realized via implementing our proposed solutions to follow
under the additive secret sharing scheme.
This scheme makes use of a different set of mathematical
principles to achieve secure multi-party computation, though
modular arithmetic still lies at the core of its security. The
underlying security is dependent on the fact that adding any
value to a uniformly randomly selected value, modulus a value
delimiting the group, N , is still uniformly random [32]. It is
therefore impossible to say what the non-random component
of the sum was, when considering only the resulting sum.
In this context the sum is therefore unconditionally secure
since any adversary, unbounded by limits on computational
power, can do no better than also simply randomly guess
at what the two original values may have been without any
means of verification. This security is similar in principle to
the unconditional security guarantees of the One Time Pad
protocol. The weakness there being in inability to reuse the
pad due to leaks in information. In the setting of secret sharing,
however, no such concerns exist. For each and every share
new uniform random values are selected, used, and distributed,
which removes the risk for information leakage from padding
value reuse.
In the context of this scheme some of the operations are
more computationally efficient than was the case in the Shamir
Secret Sharing Scheme, but, as always, there is a trade-off.
With this secret sharing scheme, there is no ability to have
less than all the shares that were originally generated involved
in the reconstruction of the secrets. While it is fairly trivial to
distribute the shares and reconstruct the secret, all shares are
required. This is a special case of the idea previously discussed
in Section III-B1, of a threshold scheme in which t = m.
Operations in this approach are as follows [33], [34].
a) Constructing Shares: To create any desired number of
shares, m, in this scheme, the secret, s, to be shared is placed
in an equation as follows in which all [s]P1N through [s]
Pm−1
N
are uniformly randomly selected integers and [s]PmN satisfies
the equation, all in ZN :
[s]PmN = s− [s]P1N − [s]P2N − · · · − [s]Pm−1N mod N
b) Rebuilding Secrets: Rebuilding secrets in this case is
also trivial since it can clearly be seen from the preceding
all one need do is sum all the m, shares held by the parties
modulus the same integer N :
s =
m∑
i=1
[s]PiN mod N
This is the greatest area of difference for our efficiency
concerns between the two schemes. Additive secret sharing
requires only additions modulo N to rebuild secrets while
Shamir’s scheme requires polynomial interpolations. Interpo-
lations of course requiring, more operations, growing at a
higher asymptotic complexity, and requiring more complex
operations. Once again, however, we emphasize the loss of
resilience as well as being secure against only passive attacks.
c) Addition: Since this scheme simply makes use of
addition modulo N , it is possible for each party in the scheme
to acquire the share for the sum of two secrets by simply
adding, modulo N , their local shares of the two secrets. This
can be seen for the two secrets a, and b, here via some
arithmetic manipulation:
a+ b = ([a]P1N + [a]
P2
N + · · ·+ [a]PmN )
+ ([b]P1N + [b]
P2
N + · · ·+ [b]PmN ) mod N
a+ b = ([a]P1N + [b]
P1
N ) + · · ·+ ([a]PmN + [b]PmN ) mod N
d) Multiplication: This is affected among three parties
through the generation, distribution, and use of multiple ad-
ditional uniform random values from the group. They are
combined and shared among the parties in a multi-step process
which creates a complex, but secure, uniform random sharing
of the desired product among the parties. The protocol given
in the work of Bogdanov [32], [35], is as follows in Algorithm
1 for two secrets u, and v, with shares [u]P1N , [u]
P2
N , [u]
P3
N and
a similar set for v.
Algorithm 1:
SMM(〈P1, [u]P1N , [v]P1N 〉, 〈P2, [u]P2N , [v]P2N 〉, 〈P3, [u]P3N , [v]P3N 〉)
→ (〈P1, [uv]P1N 〉, 〈P2, [uv]P2N 〉, 〈P3, [uv]P3N 〉)
1 Round 1
2 Party 1 generates r12, r13, s12, s13, t12 ∈R ZN
3 Party 2 generates r21, r23, s21, s23, t23 ∈R ZN
4 Party 3 generates r31, r32, s31, s32, t31 ∈R ZN
5 All values ∗ij are sent from Pi to Pj
6 Round 2
7 Party 1 Computes:
8 aˆ12 = [u]
P1
N + r31 bˆ12 = [v]
P1
N + s31
9 aˆ13 = [u]
P1
N + r21 bˆ13 = [v]
P1
N + s21
10 Party 2 Computes:
11 aˆ23 = [u]
P2
N + r23 bˆ23 = [v]
P2
N + s12
12 aˆ21 = [u]
P2
N + r32 bˆ21 = [v]
P2
N + s32
13 Party 3 Computes:
14 aˆ31 = [u]
P3
N + r23 bˆ31 = [v]
P3
N + s23
15 aˆ32 = [u]
P3
N + r13 bˆ32 = [v]
P3
N + s13
16 All values ∗ij are sent from Pi to Pj
17 Round 3
18 Party 1 computes:
19 c1 = [u]
P1
N bˆ21 + [u]
P1
N bˆ31 + [v]
P1
N aˆ21 + [v]
P1
N aˆ31
− aˆ12bˆ21 − bˆ12aˆ21 + r12s13
+ s12r13 − t12 + t31
20 [uv]P1N = c1 + [u]
P1
N [v]
P1
N
21 Party 2 computes:
22 c2 = [u]
P2
N bˆ32 + [u]
P2
N bˆ12 + [v]
P2
N aˆ32 + [v]
P2
N aˆ12
− aˆ23bˆ32 − bˆ23aˆ32 + r23s21
+ s23r21 − t23 + t12
23 [uv]P2N = c2 + [u]
P2
N [v]
P2
N
24 Party 3 computes:
25 c3 = [u]
P3
N bˆ32 + [u]
P3
N bˆ23 + [v]
P3
N aˆ13 + [v]
P3
N aˆ23
− aˆ31bˆ13 − bˆ31aˆ13 + r31s32
+ s31r32 − t31 + t23
26 [uv]P3N = c3 + [u]
P3
N [v]
P3
N
The proof of correctness is verbose, but straightforward, we
would direct the reader to the thorough treatment it is given
in [32]. The communication complexity of this protocol is 27`
bits in three rounds among the three parties according to the
referenced paper and analysis. However, in consonance with
our definition concerning a computational round, this could be
considered as requiring two rounds.
3) Unbounded Fan-in Multiplication: It is possible to com-
pute products an arbitrary number of secret shared group
elements in constant rounds, for either of the two preceding
schemes, through the methods introduced my Bar Ilan and
Beaver [36]. For a set of k elements which should all be
multiplied together, k+1 random shared elements must be gen-
erated, and have their shared multiplicative inverse calculated.
Thus [r0]
Pj
N . . . [rk]
Pj
N as well as [r
−1
0 ]
Pj
N . . . [r
−1
k ]
Pj
N should be
shared among all the participating parties Pj . For the set of
elements for which the product is desired [s1]
Pj
N . . . [sk]
Pj
N the
parties need to cooperate in calculating and reconstructing
s′i = [ri−1]
Pj
N [si]
Pj
N [ri]
Pj
N
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Locally the parties can compute the product
of all these s′i such that
s′ =
k∏
i=1
s′i
Finally one additional cooperative calculation yields shares of
the desired product
s = [r−10 ]
Pj
N s
′[rk]
Pj
N
In total such a product requires generating 2(k+1) random
values, evaluating 3k+2 binary input products, and cooperating
in 2k+1 reveal operations in 5 rounds. To go into more
detail than counts of secure multi-party protocol invocations a
selection of a scheme is required. Differences in complexity
for all aspects, local computations, communications, and round
complexity exist between Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and
additive secret sharing.
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we propose our solutions by which a firewall
can be secured in an information-theoretic sense and dis-
tributed across multiple servers that evaluate the firewall func-
tions quickly and efficiently while maintaining a higher level
of security than previously proposed systems. The proposed
solutions can also be expanded to include resilience in the face
of some subset of servers failing and being additionally secure
against attempts to manipulate the firewall via the primitives
and nature of the underlying mathematical constructs. In the
descriptions to follow, we have assumed a blacklist approach
to the firewall construction due to the possible but unlikely
event of a false positive test result being more tolerable in
general for a firewall.
The proposed protocols can be classified into three cate-
gories according to different aspects of firewall management:
(1) firewall initialization, (2) firewall rule evaluation and (3)
firewall rule or policy update.
• Firewall initialization: Given a false positive error rate,
the size of the blacklist, the initialization protocols can
decide the Bloom filter size and the number of hash
Fig. 3. Constrained Network Topol-
ogy
Fig. 4. Unconstrained Network
Topology
functions. Then the Boom filter representation of the
blacklist will be produced. Depending on the adversary
model, either additive or Shamir secret sharing scheme,
as discussed in Section III-B, will be used to generate
secretly shared Bloom filter, and each share is provided
to one of the designated servers for oblivious firewall
management and evaluation. Thus, each server has shares
of the Bloom filter representing the rules of the firewall,
and they are collectively ready for firewall rule evalua-
tions. This initialization of generating secret shares of the
Boom filter is assumed to be a trusted process, and after
that, we consider various threats to the security of the
proposed methods to obliviously manipulate and evaluate
the firewall policies and rules.
• Firewall rule evaluation: We developed several protocols
for firewall rule evaluation with various security guar-
antees. In the proposed protocols, we assume that the
firewall has been initialized, that is, the information of
interest, such as IP addresses on the blacklist have already
been hashed and a Bloom filter has been constructed and
exist as shares across the servers to be involved in the
firewall evaluation.
• Firewall rule or policy update: When firewall rules and
policies are updated, the Bloom filter representing this
firewall also needs to be updated according. In addition,
secret shares of the Bloom filter need to be updated as
well at each server. We developed a secure protocol to
perform these actions to update our oblivious firewall.
For the rest of the paper, our proposed schemes are de-
scribed with several key system parameters shown in Table
I. Before providing the details for implementing a secured
and distributed firewall evaluation function among independent
servers, we next clarify the network topologies assumed in this
work.
η The number of addresses to add to the Bloom filter
β Number of bit locations in the Bloom filter
κ Number of hash functions used in checking set membership
via the Bloom filter
t Threshold from the Shamir secret sharing scheme
m Number of parties involved in the secret sharing scheme
N Prime modulus for the secret sharing scheme
TABLE I
COMMON NOTATIONS
A. Network Topology
Two general types of situations exist with respect to fire-
wall concerns. Settings in which the network topology is
constrained such that there exists a single gateway server to
the wider Internet, such as which is depicted in Figure 3.
The other situation is for less control than a pure centralized
topology, but it is centralized up to an arbitrary number of links
between the local network and the rest of the Internet. This is
depicted in Figure 4. For our following proposed approaches,
unlike either of the previously discussed cases from Section
II, the structure of the firewall is distributed in a secret
shared format. The control function is evaluated via secure
multi-party computation techniques, and either topology is
acceptable in our scheme.
1) Centralized Topology: In the centralized or constrained
topology setting, the firewall exists on the main server acting
as a gateway. With every packet arriving, the sole bridge
between the local and external networks conducts the source
checking against the rules of the firewall. The result of this
check leads to the packet’s forwarding or rejection. The rules
in this case normally exist within the settings of this single
machine and are thus potentially and easily manipulatable,
particularly by a malicious insider. Once the malicious be-
haviors have been carried out, it may be difficult for parties
within the network to identify the alteration which represents
a serious security risk to the local network [1].
As mentioned previously, there may be additional motiva-
tions to keep the rules of the system itself secret from most par-
ties after the system has been initialized. Disclosure of these
rules may result in undesirable leaks of information regarding
people and entities outside of the local organization. For our
protocol to follow, this gateway would invoke the protocols
among the servers who would evaluate the firewall function
and all send their shares of the result back to the gateway. The
gateway can then reconstruct the result from combinations of
the shares and both identify malicious behavior by the servers
and permit or reject network traffic in accordance with the
firewall rules.
2) Distributed Topology: In a situation without the benefit
of a constrained topology, the firewall must be distributed
by some means. If many machines may have access to the
external larger Internet, this mesh must have tools to consis-
tently, efficiently and reliably maintain the functionality of the
firewall in a distributed manner. This is achieved in many cases
by associating the firewall rules with the forwarding tables for
other network nodes [20]. However, these existing methods
dramatically increase the risk of information leakage regarding
firewall rules, alteration and inconsistency of the rules among
each machine in the network.
For our proposed solution to follow, each machine on the
fringe of the network, connected both internally and to the
external network, can act similarly to the constrained case
previously described. Each of these machines, serving as a
gateway, can invoke the the protocols among the servers
sharing the filter who all return shares of the result of the
firewall evaluation according to our forthcoming protocols.
Again, the invoking machine would use combinations of the
shares to rebuild the result to identify malicious activity and
control packet flow.
B. Initialization
The main challenge during the firewall initialization process
is to determine the Bloom filter and the number of hash
functions needed to construct the filter. Equations 1 and 2
given in Section III-A can help the decision making in this
regard. Since the size of the blacklist η is known and the
probability of a false positive is approximated by 0.6185β/η ,
fixing the false positive rate will lead to the size of the Bloom
filter β. Consequently, the number of hash functions κ can be
calculated by Equation 2. For example, suppose η= 1,000,000
(one million)and the false positive rate is 0.001. Then β ≈ 14.5
million bits. As a result, the number of hash functions is about
14.5 × ln 2 ≈ 10. As for the hash functions, we can adopt
universal hash in the form of hash(x) = ax + b mod q,
where q is the smallest prime bigger than β, and a and b are
randomly selected from {1, . . . , q − 1}.
Algorithm 2:
firewallInit(〈Admin, addri〉, 〈P1,⊥〉 . . . 〈Pm,⊥〉)
→ (〈Admin,⊥〉, 〈P1, [φj ]P1N 〉 . . . 〈Pm, [φj ]PmN 〉)
Input: IP addresses (addri) or other information of
interest, for i = 1 . . . η
Output: φj for j = 1 . . . β is shared among the m parties
1 Admin
(a) φj = 0, for j = 1 . . . β
(b) φj = 1,∀j ∈ {hashq(addri) mod β and
∀q ∈ 1 . . . κ, i ∈ 1 . . . η}
(c) genShares(φj), for j = 1 . . . β
(d) send [φj ]PiN to Pi, for i = 1 . . .m and j = 1 . . . β
During a trusted initialization phase, the addresses forming
the blacklist are hashed with the prescribed functions, and the
Bloom filter is constructed. This vector of bits is secret shared
using the methods introduced in Section III and sent to each
of the shareholder parties to participate in the scheme. Once
these two steps have been completed the online operation of
the system may commence. The main steps of the initialization
process are presented in Algorithm 2.
C. Secure Distributed Firewall Evaluation
As mentioned before, we developed two secure protocols
to evaluate firewall rules obliviously distributed among m
servers: P1, . . . , Pm. In this section, we only discuss the first
one. The main evaluation condition behind this protocol is
based on the following condition determined by the construc-
tion of the Bloom filter:
• The IP address (addr) of the incoming message is on
the blacklist if the sum of the values stored in the Bloom
filter locations indexed by the κ hash functions with addr
as their input is equal to κ.
If the above condition is true, the package will be blocked.
The design of our first protocol is to ensure the condition can
be verified without disclosing the actual content of the Bloom
filter. The key steps of the protocol are presented in Algorithm
3.
Algorithm 3:
firewallEval(〈Gateway, addr〉, 〈P1,⊥〉 . . . 〈Pm,⊥〉)
→ (〈Gateway, σ〉, 〈P1,⊥〉 . . . 〈Pm,⊥〉)
Input: IP address (addr) or other information of interest,
parties should be in possession of shares of the
firewall represented as a Bloom filter, this is a
vector [φj ]PiN , for j = 0 . . . β − 1 and i = 1 . . .m,
Public info: N the modulus of the secret sharing
scheme
Output: σ is revealed by the Gateway
1 Gateway
(a) addr ← IP address (or other info of interest) extracted
from packet
(b) Send addr to Pi, for i = 1 . . .m
2 Pi for i = 1 . . .m
(a) [σ]PiN =
∑
j [φj ]
Pi
N : j ∈ {hashq(addr)
mod β,∀q ∈ 1 . . . κ}
(b) Send [σ]PiN to Gateway
3 Gateway
(a) reveal(σ) for all valid combinations of t out of m′
shares within a specific time window, where m′ < m
(b) if m′ > t and all
(
m
t
)
reveals do not agree: flag
malicious behavior
(c) if the majority of all the revealed σ values are equal to
κ: block packet
(d) else: forward packet
1) Key steps and correctness analysis: Note that the param-
eter N denote the size of the secret shares. In this protocol, in
order to represent the sum of the values from locations indexed
by the κ hash functions, N needs to be bigger than κ. In step
1, the gateway receives a packet from which the IP address
or other information of interest is extracted. The IP address is
sent to the set of parties (the servers who manage the firewall)
implementing the distributed secret sharing scheme. In step
two, the parties hash the received address with all k hash
functions modulo β, and this set of calculated values are the
indices to the locations of the secretly shared Bloom filter, and
the values (i.e., secret shares) stored in these locations should
be summed. This summation is computed, and the result is
sent back to the Gateway.
In step 3, the Gateway reconstructs the result of the
computation and compares it against κ. Due to the nature
of the Bloom filter, this result will be equal to κ if and
only if every location in the summation was 1, which is
exactly the criteria indicating set membership according to the
Bloom filter construction. Since network faults may occur and
malicious adversaries may disable one or more servers among
the m servers, the gateway could only receive m′ shares within
an expected time window. The additional combinations and
criteria are directed at security concerns for the proposed
protocol which is addressed in greater detail in Section IV-C3.
2) Complexity analysis: In this setting, the Gateway sends
the data of interest to the set of servers forming the share-
holding parties in the secret sharing scheme. We assume that
this is an IP address in the context of our presentation, and
we will continue that common and useful assumption in the
context of this analysis. As we note in Section II, even though
we are more than 10 years out from the acceptance of the
IPv6 standards, IPv4 is still strongly in the majority for traffic,
thus we assume IPv4 addresses of 32 bits. In the second
step of the protocol, all m parties send the result of their
summations to the Gateway thus the required communications
will be m log2N . This send and receive cycle constitutes
one computational round, and completes the communication
requirements for this protocol. The total communication com-
plexity is m(32 + log2N) bits in a single round.
3) Proofs of security for passive attacks: We define our
notions of security in consonance with the proposed definitions
and conventions of Goldreich [37]. As discussed at length
there, a protocol is secure in the computation of a desired func-
tionality given that the view of the execution of the protocol, or
execution image, is indistinguishable from that generated by a
simulator. Here we define our security in information theoretic
terms for passive attacks as described previously. These attacks
include attempts to extract information from what data may
be visible on a compromised server, observing traffic on a
compromised server, and observing visible network traffic.
In general, with respect to the last point, we assume that
the servers are in one of two situations, they are all on
different local subnets, or all the servers communications are
encrypted in transit. Under these circumstances, the attackers
can only observe encrypted internal network traffic. Thus, no
information regarding the Bloom filter or the firewall rules and
policies are leaked to the attachers. With respect to the two
other concerns listed, we provide the following analysis and
arguments for security.
Given a functionality f(x, y) operating on the inputs x and
y and a protocol Π implementing this functionality, then an
execution image for Π is denoted by {VIEWΠ1 (x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗
for party P1. What is needed to prove security of Π is an
algorithm S1 which, given the public information as well
as the necessary private information from P1, P1 is able
to produce a simulated execution image of Π, denoted by
{S1(x, f1(x, y))}x,y∈{0,1}∗ for some simulator algorithm S1.
If there is an equivalence between the simulated and real
execution images in an information theoretic sense, then the
protocol is secure with this guarantee for passive adversaries.
Thus, the goal is to demonstrate the following equivalence
which is given for a party P1 though, in general, it would
need to be demonstrated for all parties:
{S1(x, f1(x, y))}x,y∈{0,1}∗ ≡ {VIEWΠ1 (x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗
Since our protocol is symmetric; that is, all parties P1, . . . , Pm
who are responsible for obliviously managing the firewalls
perform the same operations, it is sufficient to show the
equivalence from one party’s perspective to prove the protocol
is secure for all parties.
The view of the servers in this situation is comprised of two
different components. First they receive shares of the Bloom
filter, these shares disclose no information regarding the filter
itself, or the firewall rules it represents. This is immediate
from the underlying secret sharing scheme. They additionally
receive IP addresses which are queried for membership in
the set comprising the firewall rules. The only use of this
information is in generating the indices for share summation.
Summing the shares, or any other local operation performed,
yields no information to a shareholder without bounds on
available computational power. This too is immediate from
the properties of the secret sharing scheme. Thus, a trivially
implementable simulator for this view consists of sending a
random string of 32 bits representing an IP address to query on
the system. The servers are expecting arbitrary 32 bit strings
and will proceed in their calculations revealing no information
among themselves without malicious behaviors. This is the
property we wished to demonstrate for passive adversaries.
a) Protocol simplification: If security concerns are only
against passive attacks, one may eliminate revealing many
combinations of shares at steps 3(a) and 3(b) of Algorithm
3.In this case, we can use additive secret sharing as opposed
to Shamir’s scheme and immediately realize a considerable
performance improvement as alluded to in Section III-B2.
With the change of secret sharing scheme, the step 3(b) can
be eliminated, and as for the reveal function at step 3(a),
the Gateway only needs to execute one summation among all
the shares received from the servers and one comparison to
make a decision, a very fast and efficient operation. Therefore,
the final steps of the protocol can be simplified, but we have
chosen to present the more complex and more secure approach
earlier as we will presently explain.
4) Malicious adversaries: Malicious adversaries may do
anything a passive adversary can do and more. For example,
a malicious adversary may deviate from the protocol or
manipulate their intermediate calculations. These deviations
we wish to at least detect, and possibly identify the malicious
party as well. Specifically, the active attacks we consider are
(1) disabling a participating server, (2) reading data which is
normally expected to be protected, and (3) modifying data
which is normally expected to be protected.
a) A combinational approach: With respect to the first
concern listed, we would draw attention to the fact that this is
“built in” to the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme provided that
m > t, since any set of t shares can be used to reconstruct
the secret. With respect to the other two concerns we provide
the following analysis and arguments for security.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme affords us the opportunity
to achieve detection and identification of malicious adversaries
relatively efficiently due to the fact that it is a threshold
secret sharing scheme. If a sufficiently large number of parties,
greater than the threshold, participate in the scheme, it is
straightforward to detect malicious manipulation of the shares,
or, with more parties, identify a malicious adversary. As we
have discussed in Section III-B1, Shamir’s scheme uses a
threshold number of parties to reveal secret shared values,
while an arbitrarily large number of parties may participate
in the scheme. If the number of parties m is set such that
m ≥ t + 1, then a malicious adversary may manipulate their
share of the computational result to change the revealed value,
only when their share of the result is used in the revealing
process. Thus, for a set of 4 parties, a threshold of three, a
malicious P1, and a shared value s, the following equivalence
relations, meaning the output of the reveal function being
incorrect, hold for the reveal functionality when P1 has altered
[s]P1N .
reveal
(
[s]P1N , [s]
P2
N , [s]
P3
N
)
≡ reveal
(
[s]P1N , [s]
P3
N , [s]
P4
N
)
≡ reveal
(
[s]P1N , [s]
P2
N , [s]
P4
N
)
However, the other available combination of shares is not equal
to the other two, specifically
reveal
(
[s]P1N , [s]
P2
N , [s]
P3
N
)
6≡ reveal
(
[s]P2N , [s]
P3
N , [s]
P4
N
)
by the simple and direct principles of polynomial interpolation
on which this functionality depends. Therefore, in this case it
is possible to detect malicious behavior due to the fact that all
combinations of shares used for reconstruction of the secret do
not agree. There is a problem still. The majority of the revealed
values are all influenced by the malicious party’s actions.
When the difference between m and t grows wider, e.g.,
m ≥ 2t+1, revealing shared values becomes more treacherous
for a malicious adversary. In this case, the majority of revealed
combinations will agree on the correct value, and identifying
the malicious party becomes very easy. In the minimal case,
where m = 2t+ 1 there are
(
2t+1
t
)
combinations possible for
revealing the shared value, and only
(
2t
t−1
)
of them will be
able to be influenced by any malicious party. Therefore, the
following expression gives the exact fraction of combinations
of shares to be used in polynomial reconstruction which it will
be possible for a malicious adversary to influence:(
2t
t−1
)(
2t+1
t
) = 2t!(t−1)!(t+1)!
(2t+1)!
t!(t+1)!
=
t
2t+ 1
Additionally, in general, a set of x malicious parties, by the
same reasoning, the maximum number of shares that can be
influenced by the malicious parties is defined by:
min(x,t)∑
i=1
(
x
i
)(
m− x
t− i
)
Thus, in order for the honest adversaries to be able to agree
on the correct value by a majority agreement scheme, such
as that represented in the Byzantine General’s problem, a
majority of the share combinations must recombine to form the
correct solution. Therefore, the following inequality should be
preserved to guarantee the correctness of the protocol against
actively malicious adversaries:(
m
t
)
> 2
min(x,t)∑
i=1
(
x
i
)(
m− x
t− i
)
In a specific case, where t = 3 and m = 2t + 1 = 7,
there are 35 combinations valid for reconstructing the shared
secret. It is evident that a malicious entity can influence 15
combinations for rebuilding the secret, while the majority 20
of the share combinations will remain uninfluenced. Thus not
only will a malicious party’s activity be detectable, the party is
easily identifiable through the minority of reconstructed values
consisting of those with exactly one member in common
across all combinations of shares used in their reconstruction,
specifically the malicious party.
Suppose m′ is the number of messages received by the
gateway from the m servers, where t ≤ m′ ≤ m. The
following conditions specify when malicious behaviors can
be detected or prevented:
• Malicious behavior detection: When there are at least t
shares from honest servers, the detection of malicious
behaviors is possible.
• Correctness guarantee (or malicious behavior prevention):
When
(
m′
t
)
> 2
∑min(x,t)
i=1
(
x
i
)(
m′−x
t−i
)
and x < m′,
malicious behaviors, including disabling the servers and
modifying the shares, will not influence the correctness
of the protocol.
b) Berlekamp-Welch Error Correcting Algorithm: The
preceding approach is sufficient for small sets of parties with
few to no adversaries and can be reasonably efficient for this
setting. If large sets of parties are involved the means which
we have proposed for checking for malicious behavior become
cumbersome and prohibitive in complexity. When large sets of
parties are involved another approach, will be more beneficial.
We do not address the details of this alteration in any great
depth, but do present the intuition of the additional steps for
consideration of this potential case.
We base the additional steps on the well known, resilient,
and efficient Berlekamp-Welch algorithm for error correction
[38]. Since the parties already hold shares of a polynomial, all
that is required is a different set of steps at the server holing
the packet in question. Rather than rebuilding the shares to
reclaim the secret as is normally done, the shares received
are used to construct a linear system which is solved locally.
This allows for the correct reconstruction of the polynomial
underlying the shares representing the filter evaluation, which
is equivalent to revealing the shared secret, but with some
extra benefit due to special properties of the system. The
identification of the error laden points in the interpolation is
possible thereby allowing the honest parties to root out the
adversary in their midst. This does not hold in all cases for
any values of m the number of parties which are shareholders
in the scheme, and t the threshold of the scheme, but only
for at most m−t+12 malicious shareholders in the scheme.
This is achieved by identifying the shares, really points on a
polynomial is Shamir’s scheme, which are causing the majority
of other points to not lie on the interpolated polynomial. The
local complexity of this operation is straightforward in O(m3)
which is obviously a large improvement over O(mt ) ≈ O(m!)
for large groups of parties. Lower complexities than O(m3)
are possible through other methods.
c) Byzantine Agreement: In the previous presentation of
our protocols the ultimate decision to block or forward a
packet was made based on the computations of the Gateway
alone. While this is a very efficient means, it may not meet
the security requirements for all interested parties. We thus
further extend the security of our protocol by requiring that
the decision to accept or reject the packets be a multi-party
computation as well. We achieve this by altering the final
step of the protocols, as previously given, to send the shared
computation result to not only the Gateway, but every other
party involved in the scheme. This necessarily increases the
complexity by an additional m(m−1) log2N bits, but allows
for each of the servers along with the Gateway to rebuild
the result of the computation. Once this has been achieved,
they can each locally consider the rebuilt values, come to a
decision, and then begin a Byzantine agreement process to
make sure that they are all in agreement with the proper way
to proceed. While this initially seems like a cumbersome step,
recent research has lead to great improvements in Byzantine
agreement and fault tolerance protocols [39], [40], [41]. Given
the promising results of these research endeavors, Byzantine
agreement has been made considerably more feasible and less
costly of an operation than was previously the case. The
additional complexity from the Byzantine agreement scheme
itself is dependent on the choice of approach though we
have proposed a few options an in depth analysis of the
complexity of these protocols is somewhat outside the scope
of our present work. However, similar to our use, this type
of agreement mechanism is increasing in appearance due to
some of the discoveries of performance improvements, most
notably perhaps in cryptocurrencies [42], [43].
D. Secure Distributed Firewall Protocol 2
1) Key steps and correctness analysis: The steps in this
version of the protocol are all exactly identical with one small,
through very significant difference. Instead of a summation a
product is called for in step 2. This results in large changes
for both the complexity and the amount of information to
be hidden. Now the revealed values will be either 0 or 1
exclusively. The revealed result will be one iff every indexed
element involved in the product is 1. This is again directly
analogous to the result of checking for set membership using
a Bloom filter directly. This additional information hidden is
the contents of the filter itself, which may be advantageous
for some use-cases.
2) Complexity analysis for Protocol 2: The initialization is
the same as previously, the first transmitted message is the
same, and the conclusion of the protocol is the same with
Algorithm 4:
firewallEval(〈Gateway, addr〉, 〈P1,⊥〉, . . . 〈Pm,⊥〉, )
→ (〈Gateway, pi〉, 〈P1,⊥〉 . . . 〈Pm,⊥〉)
Input: IP address (addr) or other information of interest,
parties should be in possession of shares of the
firewall represented as a Bloom filter, this is a
vector [φj ]PiN for j = 0 . . . r − 1, i = 1 . . .m.
Public info: N the modulus of the secret sharing
scheme
Output: pi is revealed by the Gateway
1 Gateway
(a) addr ← IP address (or other info of interest) extracted
from packet
(b) Send addr to Pi, for i = 1 . . .m
2 Pi for i = 1 . . .m
(a) [pi]PiN =
∏
j [φj ]
Pi
N : j ∈ {hashq(addr)
mod β,∀q ∈ 1 . . . κ}
(b) Send [pi]PiN to Gateway
3 Gateway
(a) reveal(pi) for all valid combinations of t out of m
shares
(b) if all
(
m
t
)
reveals do not agree flag malicious behavior
(c) if pi = 1: block packet
(d) else: forward packet
all parties sending their share of the result to the Gateway.
Thus the complexity is the same for these steps, requiring
m(32 + log2N) bits. On top of this we add some additional
communications and operations due to the fact that products
cannot be evaluated without interaction among the parties.
Assuming that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is the scheme
in use and that m = 2t − 1, the unbounded fan-in product
drives up the cost.
The additional cost for this operation, as we gave previously
in Section III-B3 is in generating 2(κ + 1) random values,
evaluating 3κ + 2 binary input products, and cooperating in
2κ + 1 reveal operations in 5 rounds. Generating a shared
random value requires all m parties to send shares of a locally
generated random value to the other m− 1 parties. Thus this
operation requires m(m−1) log2N bits each. The complexity
of a standard binary secure multiplication in Shamir’s scheme
is the same. Revealing a shared value is achieved simply
by all parties exchanging their shares and locally rebuild-
ing the secret, which is again the same complexity. Thus
the communication complexity for this protocol version is
(7κ+ 5)(m(m− 1) log2N) +m(32 + log2N) in 6 rounds.
3) Proofs of security for a semi-honest adversary: With re-
spect to security, the arguments of the previous protocol hold,
and we additionally strengthen the ability to hide the contents
of the filter itself. We do so by considerably lengthening the
expected time to the filter’s contents becoming known through
the alteration from summation to multiplication of the Bloom
filter indices mentioned previously.
Consider the previous protocol, Given a large number of
queries, information may accrue which will allow the con-
tents and structure of the Bloom filter to be reconstructed.
Revealing the Bloom filter does not necessarily imply a leak
of information with respect to the firewall we are using it to
represent. Nevertheless, our second protocol prevents even the
filter’s structure from being revealed. This information may
be extracted over time with the previous protocol version by
saving a record of IP addresses and reconstructed results at
the Gateway. Imagine a packet arrives with an IP address that
hashes to 4,5, and 6. If the rebuilt summation of these locations
equals 2, then obviously 2 of the previously mentioned indices.
Imagine a second packet arrives with an address which hashes
to 1, 5, and 6. In this case too let us assume that the revealed
value is 2. Finally a third packet arrives with an address which
hashes to 1, 4, and 7. The revealed summation result here we
shall take as 0 for this example. Given these three instances,
we can deduce with certainty that the Bloom filter has these
contents [?0, 01, ?2, ?3, 04, 15, 16, 07] for the respective indices
given in the subscripts.
Again this may be tolerable in some instances and it may
be preferable to hide this in others. In the previous example,
if our second proposed protocol were followed, the result for
every case would be 0. Therefore the vector would still consist
of only uncertainties rather than having some of the values
known. Information may still be gleaned from this second
protocol by similar means, but the rate of its accrual is much
slower since only combinations which return a 1 will yield
any sure foundations for deduction.
E. Performance Evaluation
1) Initialization: The runtime of this process is plotted as
a function of the number of locations in the Bloom filter β
and m the number of parties in the secret sharing scheme. We
have covered a very large range in β from the necessary width
for about 100 entries in the firewall to nearly 1% of the IPv4
address space with a small error rate selected of .01. This is
diagrammed in Figures 5, add 6. Note the use of a log scale on
the β axis and for the runtime axis and color gradient. When
graphed with respect to β, m is fixed at 10, and when graphed
with respect to m, β is fixed at For firewalls containing a very
large number of entries, this process can get somewhat lengthy,
but need only be done once. Additionally, this performance test
has been done under Python and without parallelization. In
practice, implementation with c or c++ and taking advantage
of parallelization would both yield dramatic performance
improvements for large firewall. Online performance is much
better, even for large firewalls, as we will presently show.
2) Firewall Evaluation: A graphical depiction of the sim-
ulated runtime of this protocol as a function of κ and m is
given in Figures 7, and 8. As can be seen by inspection, Even
a maximal κ of 20 and m = 20 the evaluation of the firewall
function via the Bloom filter is still well under a millisecond.
Additionally, a κ of 20 will allow the error rate of the Bloom
filter to be less than .00001 with appropriate β and η values
as discussed in Section III-A.
Fig. 5. Runtime of system initial-
ization as a function of β with m
fixed
Fig. 6. Runtime of system initializa-
tion as a function of m with β fixed
Fig. 7. Runtime of Algorithm 3 as
a function of κ with m fixed
Fig. 8. Runtime of Algorithm 3 as
a function of m with κ fixed
F. Additional Operations
We also propose in this section two additional possibilities
which may be of interest. The first extends the capabilities
of our approach making additions to the firewall represented
in the context of the Bloom filter extensible over time. We
allow the insertion of new elements following the initialization
and sharing of the filter via a simple and efficient means.
Secondly, we propose a variation of our protocol which allows
for the decision to be made collectively rather than being made
solely in the Gateway regarding the rejection or forwarding
of packets. This will of course drive up complexity, but in
return it also provides potentially more incentive for honesty
as malicious activities become even harder to hide.
1) Adding elements to the Firewall: In many situations,
subsequent to the establishment of security measures, new
threats may be identified, and there will therefore be a
strong desire to include such threats in a blacklist. If the
list structure were static, this could pose a serious problem
since a new structure would have to be constructed and shared
from scratch. Thus we propose a simple means by which
elements may be added to the Bloom filter representing the
firewall rules without disturbing elements already encoded in
that structure. Assuming some kind of strict access control
structure is in place, on each server participating in the secret
sharing scheme, the following computation must be executed
for the new address (addr) to be inserted in the filter. This
operation is invoked by a trusted system administrator.
[φj ]
Pi
N =[φj ]
Pi
N + 1− [φj ]PiN
: j ∈ {hashq(addr) mod β ∀q ∈ 1 . . . κ}
Care must be taken in this operation since the shared values
in the Bloom filter should be exclusively 0 or 1 we cannot
allow this manipulation to introduce shares of elements aside
from those two. Thus we cannot simply increment the shares
for each location resulting from the modular hash of the
address in question. In the above expression each location,
iff it is previously 0 gets incremented to 1. Additionally, if it
is previously 1, it remains unchanged, as desired.
2) More complex rules: The rules which have been con-
sidered up to this point have been entirely based on some
combination of source and destination IP address and perhaps
port information. It is possible however for our proposed
system to handles rules of greater complexity. Individual
Internet protocols may be considered or various packet flags.
Any information contained within a packet may be the focus
of a rule under our system. For separate criteria however
one must either greatly expand the magnitude of the Bloom
filers in use to cover the additional cases represented by
these additional criteria, or, as we argue more strongly for,
multiple filters are constructed, evaluated in parallel, and the
results of the evaluation composed to form the final result
of the evaluation concerning whether the packet should be
permitted to pass the firewall, or whether it should be dropped.
Given the case of presented in Algorithm 4. Multiple filters
could be constructed based on focus, e.g. one for source IP
address, one for destination IP address, one for source port,
one for destination port, one for protocol type, etc. Once
the individual results of each filter have been calculated, but
before these results are returned to the server, the product of
all the individual filter results should be calculated with the
appropriate primitive of the secret sharing scheme being used.
Thus iff the result of every filter is 1, the resulting product
will still be one. If for any individual filter, or set of filters,
the result is 0, the product will obviously be 0. This step has
the added benefit of hiding from the server or any other party,
which of the criteria caused the packet to be dropped. While
this does add additional complexity to the scheme, it is still
able to be done in constant rounds, and is well within the
realms of practical realization.
V. CONCLUSION
Our contribution in this paper amounts to a suite of proto-
cols for a secure, distributed, and oblivious, firewall evaluation
scheme. We have achieved this new and innovative paradigm
through the use of secret sharing schemes as well as Bloom
filters to represent the firewall and affect the evaluation of
a packet’s membership in the rules of the firewall. We have
proposed multiple means for implementing this functionality
with various options to increase efficiency or security, includ-
ing fault tolerance, and security against malicious adversaries
attempts to disrupt the system. Furthermore, we have shown
that our proposed approach need not be static, but can be dy-
namically updated if necessary to handle new threats or other
security issues. All of this we achieve with reasonably low
overhead depending on design choices and security concerns.
Overall this method presents a novel set of ideas which are
for the first time presented in the literature to achieve firewall
distribution and obfuscation in this way.
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